Considering a multiple-user multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channel with an eavesdropper, this letter develops a beamformer design to optimize the energy efficiency in terms of secrecy bits per Joule under secrecy quality-of-service constraints. This is a very difficult design problem with no available exact solution techniques. A path-following procedure, which iteratively improves its feasible points by using a simple quadratic program of moderate dimension, is proposed. Under any fixed computational tolerance the procedure terminates after finitely many iterations, yielding at least a locally optimal solution. Simulation results show the superior performance of the obtained algorithm over other existing methods.
keeping it confidential from eavesdroppers [2] , [4] . On the other hand, energy efficiency (EE) has emerged as another important figure-of-merit in assessing the performance of communication systems [5] , [6] . For most systems, both security and energy efficiency are of interest, and thus it is of interest to combine these two metrics into a single performance index called the secrecy EE (SEE), which can be expressed in terms of secrecy bits per Joule.
Transmit beamforming can be used to enhance the two conflicting targets for optimizing SEE in multiple-user multiple-input multiple-output (MU-MIMO) communications: mitigating MU interference to maximize the users' information throughput, and jamming eavesdroppers to control the leakage of information. However, the current approach to treat both EE [7] , [8] and SEE [9] , [10] is based on costly zero-forcing beamformers, which completely cancel the MU interference and signals received at the eavesdroppers. The EE/SEE objective is in the form of a ratio of a concave function and a convex function, which can be optimized by using Dinkelbach's algorithm [11] . Each Dinkelbach's iteration still requires a log-det function optimization, which is convex but computationally quite complex. Moreover, zero-forcing beamformers are mostly suitable for low code rate applications and are applicable to specific MIMO systems only. The computational complexity of SEE for single-user MIMO/SISO communications as considered in [12] and [13] is also high as each iteration still involves a difficult nonconvex optimization problem.
This letter aims to design transmit beamformers to optimize SEE subject to per-user secrecy quality-of-service (QoS) and transmit power constraints. The specific contributions are detailed in the following dot-points.
• A path-following computational procedure, which invokes a simple convex quadratic program at each iteration and converges to at least a locally optimal solution, is proposed.
The MU interference and eavesdropped signals are effectively suppressed for optimizing the SEE. In contrast to zero-forcing beamformers, higher code rates not only result in transmitting more concurrent data streams but also lead to much better SEE performance in our proposed beamformer design.
• As a by-product, other important problems in secure and energy-efficient communications, such as EE maximization subject to the secrecy level or sum secrecy throughput maximization, which are still quite open for research, can be effectively addressed by the proposed procedure.
Notation. All variables are written in boldface. For illustrative purpose, f (V) is a mapping of variable V while f (V ) is the output of mapping f corresponding to a particular inputV . I n denotes the identity matrix of size n × n. Each transmitter j is equipped with N antennas to transmit information to its intended user j equipped with N r antennas. There is an eavesdropper equipped with N e antennas, which is part of the legitimate network [1] , [4] . The channel matrices H ℓj ∈ C Nr×N and H ℓe ∈ C Ne×N from transmitter ℓ to user j and to the eavesdropper, respectively, are known at the transmitters by using the channel reciprocity, feedback and learning mechanisms [1] , [4] , [14] , [15] .
A complex-valued vector s j ∈ C d 1 contains the information transmitter j intends to convey to user j, where E s j s The received signal at user j and the signal received at the eavesdropper are
e ) are additive noises. By (1), the rate of information f j leaked from user j (in nats) is
where
On the other hand, the wiretapped throughput for user j at the eavesdropper is
The secrecy throughput in transmitting information s j to user j while keeping it confidential from the eavesdropper is defined
Following [16] , the consumed power for signal transmission is modelled by P tot (V) ζP t (V)+ P c , where
is the total transmit power of the transmitters and ζ and P c are the reciprocal of the drain efficiency of the power amplifier and the circuit power, respectively.
Consider the following secure beamformer design to optimize the system's energy efficiency:
where the constraints (6b) limit the transmit power, while (6c) are the secrecy QoS constraints.
It can be seen from their definitions (3) and (4) that both throughput f j and wiretapped throughput f j,e are very complicated functions of the beamformer variable V. The approach of [7] and [8] (to EE) and [9] and [10] (to SEE) seeks V in the class of zero-forcing beamformers algorithm is then applied to compute a zero-forcing solution of (6), which requires a log-det function optimization for each iteration. Such optimization is still computationally difficult with no available polynomial-time solvers. Note that the feasibility of the zero-forcing constraints [10] . Thus, there is not much freedom for optimizing zero-forcing beamformers whenever N is not large.
In the next section, we will provide a completely new computational approach to (6) by effectively enhancing its difficult objective and constraints.
III. PATH-FOLLOWING COMPUTATIONAL PROCEDURE
By introducing a variable t satisfying the convex quadratic constraint
the optimization problem (6) can be equivalently expressed as
In what follows, a function h is said to be a minorant (majorant, resp.) of a function f at a
, resp.) [17] .
By [18] , a concave quadratic minorant of the throughput function
To provide a minorant of the secrecy throughput f j,s (see (5)) at V (κ) , the next step is to find a majorant of the eavesdropper throughput function f j,e (V) at V (κ) . Reexpressing f j,e by
for M j,e (V) Ψ j,e (V) + (L j,e (V j )) 2 , and applying Theorem 1 in the appendix for upper bounding the first term and lower bounding the second term in (10) yields the following convex quadratic majorant of f j,e at V (κ) :
where a 
A concave quadratic minorant of the secrecy throughput function f j,s at V (κ) is then
Here, a
e . Therefore, the nonconvex secrecy QoS constraints (6c) can be innerly approximated by the following convex quadratic constraints in the sense that the feasibility of the former is guaranteed by the feasibility of the latter:
For good approximation, the following trust region is imposed:
By using the inequality
where 0 < b
which is a concave function [17] .
With regard to a (κ) j,s /t we define a concave function a (κ) j,s (t) as follows:
j,s /t, which is a concave function;
, which is a linear minorant of the convex function a
We now solve the nonconvex optimization problem (6) by generating the next feasible point (V (κ+1) , t (κ) ) as the optimal solution of the following convex quadratic program (QP), which is
Algorithm 1 Path-following Algorithm for SEE Optimization
Initialization: Set κ := 0, and choose a feasible point (V (0) , t (0) ) for (8).
κ-th iteration: Solve (16) for an optimal solution (V * , t * ) and set
an inner approximation [17] of the nonconvex optimization problem (8): (7), (12), (13). (16) Note that (16) involves n = 2DNd 1 +1 scalar real variables and m = 2D+1 quadratic constraints so its computational complexity is O(n 2 m 2.5 + m 3.5 ).
It can be seen that
). This means that, once initialized from a feasible point (V (0) , t (0) ) for (8), the κ-th QP iteration (16) generates a sequence {(V (κ) , t (κ) )} of feasible and improved points toward the nonconvex optimization problem (8) , which converges at least to a locally optimal solution of (6) [18] . Under the stopping criterion
for a given tolerance ǫ > 0, the QP iterations will terminate after finitely many iterations.
The proposed path-following procedure for computational solution of the nonconvex optimization problem (6) is summarized in Algorithm 1.
We note that a feasible initial point (V (0) , t (0) ) for (8) can be found by solving
by the iterations max
The following problem of EE optimization under users' throughput QoS constraints and secrecy levels:
where ǫ is set small enough to keep the users' information confidential from the eavesdropper, is simpler than (6) . It can be addressed by a similar path-following procedure, which solves the following QP at the κ−th iteration instead of (16):
where by the iterations
.
Lastly, the problem of sum secrecy throughput maximization
is also simpler than the SEE optimization problem (6), which can be addressed by a similar path-following procedure with the QP
solved at the κ−th iteration instead of (16) .
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
The fixed parameters are: D = 3, N = 12, N r = 6, N e = 9, σ j ≡ 1, σ e = 1, r j ≡ 1 bits/s/Hz, ζ = 1 and P c ∈ {7, 10} dB. The secrecy level ǫ = 0.05/ log 2 e is set in solving (17) . The channels are Rayleigh fading so their coefficients are generated as CN (0, 1).
For the first numerical example, the number of data streams d 1 = 3 is set, so the code rate is 3/12 = 1/4. Each V j is of size 12 × 3. Figure 1 shows the SEE performance of our proposed beamformer and the zero-forcing beamformer [9] , [10] . One can see that the former outperforms the latter substantially. Apparently, the latter is not quite suitable for both EE and SEE. The SEE performance achieved by the formulation (6) is better than that achieved by the formulation (17) because the secrecy level is enhanced with the users's throughput in the former instead of being constrained beforehand in the latter. When the transmit power P max is small, the denominator of the SEE objective in (6) and (17) is dominated by the constant circuit power P c . As a result, the SEE is maximized by maximizing its numerator, which is the system sum secrecy throughput.
On the other hand, the SEE objective is likely maximized by minimizing the transmitted power P max in its denominator when the latter is dominated by P max . That is why the SEE saturates once P max is beyond a threshold according to streams to 4 in the second numerical example. The code rate is thus 4/12 = 1/3. For this higher-code-rate case, the zero-forcing beamformers [9] , [10] are infeasible. Comparing Figure 1 and Figure 2 reveals that higher code-rate beamforming is also much better in terms of SEE because it leads to greater freedom in designing V j of size 12 × 4 for maximizing the SEE. In other words, the effect of code rate diversity on the SEE is observed. in X ∈ C m×n . Then for anyX ∈ C m×n , it is true that
